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A PENNY FOR YOUR ORGANS:  
REVISING NEW YORK’S POLICY ON 
OFFERING FINANCIAL INCENTIVES FOR 
ORGAN DONATION 
 
David I. Flamholz∗ 
“The law must be stable and yet it cannot stand still.”1 
INTRODUCTION 
Across the nation, 89,498 people are currently on a waiting list 
for suitable organs.2 In 2003 alone, close to 6,000 people died in 
the United States while waiting for transplantable organs.3 That 
breaks down to approximately sixteen people per day.4 The bottom 
line is that demand for suitable transplant organs far exceeds the 
supply. The state of New York has a major organ shortage crisis of 
                                                 
 ∗ Brooklyn Law School Class of 2006; B.A., Biology, Yeshiva University, 
1998. The author would like to thank Professor Bailey Kuklin for his advice and 
guidance, Amber Long for her input and editing, Professors Thomas J. Cossé 
and Terry M. Weisenberger for making their research available for this paper, 
and to the entire staff of the Journal of Law & Policy. Special thanks to his 
parents, Joel and Sally Flamholz, for their continued support and 
encouragement. 
1 ROSCOE POUND, INTERPRETATIONS OF LEGAL HISTORY 1 (1923). 
2 The Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network, Data, 
http://www.optn.org/ (last visited Sept. 30, 2005). 
3 Lawrence R. Reed, Encourage Organ Donors with a Little Quid Pro Quo, 
U.S.A. TODAY, July 23, 2003, at 13A (approximating a “daily death toll that 
adds up to about 6,000 a year.”). Cf. Paul Elias, Organ Need Spurs Talk of 
Financial Incentives, THE DETROIT NEWS, available at http://www. 
detnews.com/2001/health/0112/05/a04-357685.htm (Dec. 3, 2001) (citing a 
figure of 15,000 people dying per year waiting for organ transplants). 
4 Reed, supra note 3. 
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its own. In New York there are currently 8,192 people awaiting an 
organ donation.5 In light of these extenuating circumstances, it is 
time for New York to follow the lead of the federal government 
and the Pennsylvania state legislature, by reexamining its 
opposition to the sale of human organs and adopting a policy of 
offering indirect financial incentives,6 combined with a strict set of 
guidelines. Establishing a program that offers indirect monetary 
rewards to those who consent to volunteer their organs for 
donation will increase the supply of organs in the state. Further, 
following many of the guidelines established by the American 
Medical Association (AMA) will enable New York to stay within 
the legal and moral boundaries drawn by ethicists and lawmakers 
over the past fifty years, and ensure that the ethical and health 
concerns normally associated with compensation programs will be 
addressed. 
As organ replacement has evolved into an increasingly viable 
option for individuals facing organ failure, both federal and state 
legislators find themselves confronted with the difficult task of 
satisfying two competing goals: the preservation of life and the 
reduction of suffering on the one hand, and the preservation and 
protection of the highest ethical and moral standards demanded by 
American society on the other. Legislators realize that a strong 
desire to take advantage of new technological advances which may 
benefit the public must be tempered by recognizing that safeguards 
and guidelines are necessary to ensure that society’s treasured and 
respected convictions—such as integrity of the human body and 
respecting deceased wishes—are not compromised.7 
                                                 
5 The Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network, Overall by Organ, 
http://www.optn.org/latestData/rptData.asp (data last updated Sept. 9, 2005). 
6 Indirect financial incentives—as opposed to direct financial incentives—
offer compensation or discounts for various steps of the donation process 
without offering compensation for the organ itself. See infra notes 157-159 and 
accompanying text. 
7 These issues have not been confronted in the United States alone. See 
generally WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE TO ORGAN 
DONATION (1994) for a comprehensive compilation of government reactions to 
the growing field of organ donation around the world. 
FLAMHOLZ MACROED.DOC 4/18/2006 1:07 PM 
 FINANCIAL INCENTIVES FOR ORGAN DONORS 331 
 
In consideration of those two competing goals, in 1984 
Congress passed the National Organ Transplantation Act 
(NOTA),8 which prohibits the transfer of human organs for 
“valuable consideration” in inter-state commerce.9 The legislative 
history of NOTA cites an insistence that human body parts should 
never be viewed as commodities.10 Later, in 1987, the National 
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws created the 
Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (UAGA),11 which encourages states 
to prohibit the transfer of human organs for valuable consideration 
within their own borders. New York had already passed its own 
law to that effect in 1985, prohibiting the sale of human organs.12 
The legislative history of New York’s statute cites a fear of 
“widespread medical prostitution.”13 
One unfortunate consequence of these forms of protective 
legislation has been the elimination of a potentially valuable source 
of useful organs—people willing to relinquish their organs in 
return for some consideration. At present, not only does a shortage 
of organs exist, but Congress has restricted the means of obtaining 
those organs as well. A reassessment of the categorical ban on any 
                                                 
8 42 U.S.C. § 274e(a) (2001). 
9 Id. Under the United States Constitution, Congress’s power to legislate is 
limited to, among other things, those issues that affect interstate commerce. U.S. 
CONST. art. I, § 8. Thus, under the National Organ Transplantation Act, Congress 
was limited to banning the acquisition or receipt of human organs to instances 
when it affects interstate commerce. 
10 S. REP. NO. 98-382, at 17 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3975, 
3982. 
11 UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 10(a), 8A U.L.A. 62 (2003). 
12 N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4307 (McKinney 2002). 
13 1985 NEW YORK STATE LEGISLATIVE ANNUAL, Memorandum of 
Assemblyman Dennis T. Gorski 82 [hereinafter Memorandum of Assemblyman 
Gorski]. Indeed, in the international community, organ trafficking is on the rise, 
prompting a re-evaluation of international guidelines on the matter. See, e.g., 
Organ Trafficking and Transplantation Pose New Challenges, MEDICAL NEWS 
TODAY, available at http://www.medicalnewstoday.com/newssearch. 
php?newsid=13008 (Sept. 7, 2004) (suggesting that the World Health 
Organization consider updating the guiding principles in the light of current 
practices). 
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type of organ commodification plan may therefore not only be 
necessary, it may be unavoidable. Over a decade ago, medical 
experts predicted that “[t]he growing numbers [of individuals] 
waiting for cadaveric donations and the high costs of technology 
such as dialysis . . . will force the issue of commercialization into 
the national political arena in the future.”14 However, aside from 
creating a commercial market for organs, other ethically and 
legally feasible methods are available to increase organ donations. 
As discussed in this Note, the method of offering modest and 
indirect financial incentives to prospective donors is one 
potentially effective way of increasing the supply of organs while 
still retaining ethical responsibility and moral sensitivity. 
Part I of this note discusses the medical history of organ 
donation in the United States. Part II examines the organ shortage 
crisis in the United States and the various hurdles facing legislators 
who seek to remedy it. Part III delves into the various solutions 
proposed to solve the crisis. Part IV introduces the financial 
incentives solution to solve the organ donation crisis. Part V 
discusses the state of New York’s policy on organ donation. 
Finally, Part VI recommends a new method to procure organs in 
New York that is based on Pennsylvania’s already successful 
campaign to increase donor participation and consent. With this 
new method, this Note hopes to encourage legislative reform to 
increase the donor pool in New York, thereby alleviating much of 
the unfortunate deficit for organs in the New York region. 
                                                 
14 Alex Guttman & Ronald D. Guttman, Sale of Kidneys for 
Transplantation: Attitudes of the Health Care Profession and the Public, 24 
TRANSPLANTATION PROCEEDINGS 2108, 2108 (1992), cited in DAVID PRICE, 
LEGAL AND ETHICAL ASPECTS OF ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION, 370-71 (2000). 
These thoughts have more recently been echoed in an article in the American 
Journal of Law and Medicine. Gloria J. Banks, Legal & Ethical Safeguards: 
Protection of Society’s Most Vulnerable Participants in a Commercialized 
Organ Transplantation System, 21 AM. J.L. & MED. 45, 110 (1995) (“It is only a 
matter of time before this country will be forced to decide on the type of 
commercial system which should be adopted in order to meet the demand of 
transplantable human organs.”). 
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I. MEDICAL HISTORY OF ORGAN TRANSPLANTS AND DONATION 
The human species has attempted to replace organs and tissue 
since ancient times. In fact the very first organ donor was none 
other then the very first man—when Adam donated his rib to 
contribute to the creation of Eve.15 Over the past few decades, the 
skills and techniques used to perform organ transplants have 
dramatically improved.16 This improvement has lead to a steady 
annual rise in the number of transplants performed. For example, 
the number of kidney transplants has greatly increased over the 
previous quarter century. In 1982, only 5,358 kidney transplants 
were performed in the United States, while in 1986, just four years 
later, the number increased to 8,960.17 In 2003, 15,134 kidney 
transplants were performed.18 The increasing number of kidney 
transplants reflects the increase in technology and information 
available regarding the performance of organ transplants to 
patients facing organ failure.19 As technology has transformed 
                                                 
15 Genesis 2:21-22 (“And He took one of his ribs, and closed up the flesh 
instead, thereof: And from the rib, which the Lord God had taken from man, 
made He a woman.”). 
16 Laurel R. Siegel, Re-Engineering the Laws of Organ Transplantation 49 
EMORY L. J. 917, 918 (2000) (asserting that although the skills and techniques 
have changed over the centuries, the goal of prolonging life in the event of organ 
failure remains the same). 
17 Robert Pear, U.S. Will Require Hospitals to Identify Potential Organ 
Donors, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 1987, at 26. The kidney is by far the organ most 
transplanted. See Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network, Transplants 
by Donor Type, http://www.optn.org/latestData/rptData.asp (data last updated 
Sept. 9, 2005) (showing that of the 25,466 organ transplants performed in the 
United States in 2003, 15,134 of those were kidney transplants). 
18 Organ Procurement and Transplant Network, Transplants by Donor 
Type, supra note 17.  
19 See Sean Arthurs, No More Circumventing the Dead: The Least-Cost 
Model Congress Should Apply To Address the Abject Failure of Our National 
Organ Donation Regime, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 1101, 1105 (2005) (citing Michael 
Waldholz, Change of Heart: Transplant Pioneer Rejects Approach He Helped 
Create, WALL ST. J., June 2, 2003 at A1 (stating that the increase in transplants 
from 12,000 in 1988 to 25,000 in 2002 is attributable to continual improvements 
in medical and pharmacological technology)). 
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organ transplantation into a medically feasible option, the need to 
regulate the procurement and allocation of organs has become 
more critical. 
Although experiments in transplanting organs began as far 
back as the middle ages,20 it is only in the past century that the idea 
of transplanting organs from one human to another went from 
being science fiction to a medical reality.21 In 1911, the first 
human-to-human organ transplant, a testis allograft,22 was 
performed in the United States.23 Unfortunately, it was only mildly 
successful as the recipient retained testicular function for only 
three weeks.24 Since then, numerous advances have been made in 
the field of organ donation. The first heart transplant in the United 
States took place in 1967.25 However, the patient only remained 
alive for six and one half hours.26 Then, in the 1970’s, the 
invention of the immunosuppressive drug, cyclosporine, 
revolutionized the field by alleviating many of the problems 
caused by transplant rejection.27 This invention, coupled with 
various other advances in surgical techniques, led to an explosion 
in the number of organ transplants in the 1980’s and 1990’s.28 
Organ transplants throughout the rest of the world are also being 
                                                 
20 See Siegel, supra note 16, at 919 (discussing such things as tissue 
replacements for facial defects in Italy and transplanting animal tissue in 
Britain). 
21 See AUSTEN GARWOOD-GOWERS, LIVING DONOR ORGAN 
TRANSPLANTATION: KEY LEGAL AND ETHICAL ISSUES 17 (1999) (explaining that 
early in the twentieth century scientists began experiments in taking an organ 
out of one animal and placing it in another). 
22 “An allograft is a graft (transplant) of material from the body of one 
person (usually a dead person) to that of another person.” The Knee Guru, 
Dictionary, http://www.kneeguru.co.uk/html/dictionary/allograft.html (last 
visited Sept. 30, 2005). 
23 Siegel, supra note 16, at 920. 
24 Id. at 920 n.20. 
25 Id. at 920. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. at 921. 
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performed in record numbers.29 These advances in medicine have 
not, however, completely solved the organ shortage problem. 
II. THE ORGAN SHORTAGE CRISIS 
Despite the great advances in transplant technology, the deficit 
of transplantable organs grows every day. These technological 
advances have now created a sad and frustrating irony. That is, 
while the capability to safely transfer organs now exists, there are 
simply not enough organs available to meet the growing demand. 
As noted by Dr. Frank Riddick Jr., chairman of the AMA, a 
“nationwide crisis” in the shortage of available organs for 
transplants has developed, and a reliance on the low number of 
altruistic organ donations is not enough to alleviate this crisis.30 
New procurement strategies are needed to fill the gap between the 
demand for organs and the supply. However, three obstacles have 
stood in the way of the implementation of organ procurement 
methods which would elicit a more adequate supply of organs: (1) 
the inability to provide appropriate motivation to persuade people 
to consent to donate either their own organs or those of their 
deceased relatives; (2) ethical barriers which have made legislators 
throughout the nation reluctant to enact innovative legislation 
which would increase the number of organs available for 
transplant; and (3) legislative reform in the past two decades which 
has made it more difficult, for those in dire need, to obtain organs. 
                                                 
29 See Record Number of Organ Transplants Performed in the UK , 
MEDICAL NEWS TODAY, available at http://www.medicalnewstoday.com/ 
medicalnews.php?newsid=13859 (Sept. 22, 2004) (“A total of 2,863 life-giving 
transplants were carried out during 2003-2004 – the highest number ever 
performed.”). 
30 Elias, supra note 3. See infra Part II.A.1. The recognition of this “crisis” 
has been the primary motivation for AMA to reconsider its refusal to conduct a 
trial on financial incentives. Jim Warren, ASTS Ethics Committee Endorses Pilot 
Program to Test a Financial Incentive to Increase Organ Donation, 11 
TRANSPLANT NEWS 10 (May 28, 2002). See also infra Part IV.A.2.c. (discussing 
the AMA’s new policy on financial incentives). 
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A. Consent to Donate 
One primary obstacle that has stood in the way of obtaining 
more organs has been unwillingness on the part of healthy people 
to consent to donate their organs or those of their deceased 
relatives. One report predicts that relying on the altruism of the 
American public to come forth and volunteer to donate their own 
organs to help their fellow citizens in peril should on its own be 
sufficient to deal with the shortage of organs.31 However, reliance 
on altruism alone has thus far been unsuccessful. Less than 30% of 
people dying with harvestable organs ever consented to donate 
their organs.32 While the concept of organ donation has received 
widespread approval,33 many people have been unwilling to step 
forward and consent to donate their own organs.34 Both 
                                                 
31 In promoting the suggested ban on the sale or purchase of human organs, 
the U.L.A. cites a Hastings Center Report which states: 
Altruism and a desire to benefit other members of the community are 
important moral reasons which motivate many to donate. Any 
perception on the part of the public that transplantation unfairly 
benefits those outside the community, those who are wealthy enough to 
afford transplantation, or that it is undertaken primarily with an eye 
toward profit rather then therapy will severely imperil the moral 
foundations, and thus the efficacy of the system. 
UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT, Comment § 10, 8A U.L.A. 62 (2003). 
32 Reed, supra note 3. 
33 See Lloyd R. Cohen, Increasing the Supply of Transplant Organs: The 
Virtues of a Futures Market, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 9 (1989) (citing a 1985 
Gallup Poll indicating that seventy-five percent of American adults approve of 
the concept of organ donation). 
34 Id. (explaining that only twenty-seven percent were willing to donate 
their organs upon death). See Siegel, supra note 16, at 944-45 (citing a number 
of reasons why people might be reluctant to consent to donate their own organs). 
See also Thomas G. Peters, Life or Death: The Issue of Payment in Cadaveric 
Organ Donation, in THE ETHICS OF ORGAN TRANSPLANTS: THE CURRENT 
DEBATE 199 (Arthur C. Caplan & Daniel H. Coelho eds., 1998) [hereinafter THE 
ETHICS OF ORGAN TRANSPLANTS] (suggesting that relying on altruism is a form 
of imposing our own value system on those who may not share the same 
thoughts or feelings about organ donation). For an analysis of the implications 
of such a program, see John A. Sten, Rethinking the National Organ Transplant 
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psychological and religious factors serve as barriers to voluntary 
consent to organ donation.35 Such factors include: a religious belief 
in sanctity of the human body;36 a desire not to have one’s remains 
treated as mere carrion;37 and an unwillingness to contemplate 
one’s own mortality.38 
To further exacerbate the problem, the families of half of the 
people dying with harvestable organs refuse to consent to donate 
their deceased relatives’ organs, even when that decision goes 
against the wishes of the deceased.39 For instance, in 2004 the New 
York Organ Donor Network received 55,571 hospital referrals for 
organ donations in the Greater New York Metropolitan Area.40 
However, only 654 of the families of potential organ donators were 
approached, and only 308 consented to donate their family 
member’s organs upon death.41 This consent rate of 47% is below 
the national average of 55%.42 Every day the unfortunate gap 
between patients in desperate need of organs and donors 
consenting to donate their own or their deceased family member’s 
organs widens. 
This gap is unfortunate because as many people die awaiting 
organs, many medically qualified donors die without taking any 
steps to donate their organs.43 With the existence of modern 
                                                 
Program: When Push Comes to Shove, 11 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 
197, 214-19 (1994). See also Orly Hazony, Increasing the Supply of Cadaver 
Organs for Transplantation: Recognizing that the Real Problem is 
Psychological Not Legal, 3 HEALTH MATRIX 219 (1993). 
35 Cohen, supra note 33, at 8-11. 
36 Id. at 9. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. at 10 
39 Id. 
40 New York Organ Donor Network, Organ and Tissue Donation, 
http://www.donatelifeny.org/organ/2004.html (last visited Sept. 15, 2005). 
41 Id. 
42 Id. 
43 See Alexander Powhida, Forced Organ Donation: The Presumed 
Consent to Organ Donation Laws of the Various States and the United States 
Constitution, 9 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 349, 371 n.117 (1999) (citing a statistic 
which notes that “25,000 Americans suffer brain deaths every year and only 
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technology and surgical skills, each person who opts to become an 
organ and tissue donor has the potential of saving and enhancing 
up to 50 lives, and can take up to eight people off the organ 
transplant waiting list.44 Yet, any hope that medical science may 
provide to those eagerly awaiting recipients is regrettably buried 
along with the bodies of those possessing transplantable organs 
that never consented to donate them. When an individual dies 
without donating his or her organs, his or her potential life-saving 
organs regrettably go to waste. 
The challenge for legislators and policy-makers has therefore 
been to find alternative methods of encouraging people to donate 
their organs, rather than relying on their altruistic tendencies, 
thereby ensuring that suitable organs do not go to waste. 
B. Ethical Considerations 
Ethical hindrances have created another obstacle in obtaining 
adequate numbers of organs. Ethical values are a major part of the 
fabric of our society, and they also play a large role in shaping 
medical policy and law.45 Thus, while many innovative methods 
have been suggested which could potentially solve the organ 
shortage crisis in United States,46 many of these methods have 
been ignored due to ethical considerations.47 According to one 
expert in the field of organ donation, technological advances have 
placed strains on our existing ethical conceptions.48 
                                                 
2,500 become donors”). 
44 John Zen Jackson, When it Comes to Transplant Organs, Demand Far 
Exceeds Supply, 170 N.J. L.J. 910 (Dec. 16, 2002). 
45 See TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF 
BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 6-10 (4th Ed. 1994) (discussing biomedical ethics’ 
influence on the medical profession and on public policy decision making). 
46 See infra Part III (mentioning such possibilities as eliminating groups of 
people from organ donor wait-lists, adopting a policy of presumed consent, and 
allowing a free market to exist for organs). 
47 PRICE, supra note 14, at 2. 
48 See id. (“[T]he ‘technological imperative’ to keep pushing back the 
barriers can place enormous strains on our legal and ethical institutions and 
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Often, many of the pertinent ethical considerations with regard 
to organ donation depend on when and from whom the organ is 
being procured. For example, from an ethical point of view, a 
major difference exists between obtaining organs from living 
donors (in a procedure referred to as living donor organ 
transplantation or LDT) and obtaining organs from cadaveric 
donors (in a procedure referred to as cadaveric donor organ 
transplantation or CDT).49 Despite the superior survival rates when 
living donor organ transplantation is performed,50 that method 
carries with it more ethical dilemmas than does cadaveric donor 
organ transplantation.51 
1. Living Donor Organ Transplantation Ethical Considerations 
Procuring an organ from a living donor can carry with it many 
ethical complexities. One issue is the difficulty in defining “injury” 
for medical purposes. While some doctors believe that the removal 
of an organ is justified by its proprietary use in helping another,52 it 
is more often recognized that the removal of an organ for 
transplantation constitutes an “injury” in ethical terms since it 
involves physical damage and permanent destruction of the human 
body.53 Medical doctors are charged with the duty of beneficence 
and believe strongly in the principle of non-malfeasance.54 
Furthermore, all doctors take the Hippocratic Oath, which states 
                                                 
frameworks of analysis.”). 
49 See generally, GARWOOD-GOWERS, supra note 21, at xvii-xxii. Although 
there is considerable overlap in the issues existing in both LDT and CDT, they 
will be analyzed separately for the purpose of this Note. 
50 Id. at xviii. 
51 See id. at xviii-xxiv. 
52 PRICE, supra note 14, at 10. 
53 Id. 
54 GARWOOD-GOWERS, supra note 21, at 2. The principle of beneficence 
refers to a moral obligation to act for the benefit of others. BEACHUMP, supra 
note 45, at 260. The principle of non-malfeasance asserts an obligation not to 
inflict harm on others. Id. at 189. 
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that they will “help [their patients], or at least do no harm.”55 Thus, 
from the doctor’s perspective, some higher justification must exist 
for harming a living donor to make organ transplantation medically 
permissible.56 
A second issue deals with the human conception of 
“personhood.” With the goal of helping others as a priority, there is 
the potential that incompetent and insensate individuals, such as 
anencephalics57 or infants or patients in a permanent vegetative 
state,58 will be taken advantage of by the removal of their organs in 
the absence of their consent.59 The fear of procuring organs from 
non-consenting living individuals then leads to an inevitable 
dilemma: are all individuals to be treated equally when lives are at 
stake and the opportunity to save them exists, or do we place 
greater emphasis on saving the lives of the healthy, even when it is 
at the expense of losing the lives of those with who are unable to 
greatly contribute to society?60 
A third concern which affects many experimental living organ 
donor procedures is the issue of risk versus benefit.61 Policy 
makers must determine to what extent certain experimental 
procedures will be explored and tested for the sake of helping 
others, even with the full consent of the patient.62 According to 
some, a determined “threshold of benefit” should be required in 
every procedure—requiring a minimum amount of good to derive 
                                                 
55 GARWOOD-GOWERS, supra note 21. 
56 Id. at 2-3. 
57 A person without a brain. See STEDTMAN’S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 64 
(3d ed. 1972). 
58 As opposed to persons who have suffered total brain death, persons in a 
permanent vegetative state still demonstrate certain normal brain stem functions, 
such as cycles of sleep and wakefulness, the ability to breathe and maintain 
blood pressure unassisted, and several reflexes. Roby S. Shapiro, The Case of 
L.W.: An Argument for a Permanent Vegetative State Treatment Statute, 15 
OHIO ST. L.J. 439, 441 (1990). 
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from its use—to determine if it is worth attempting.63 However, 
ascertaining the appropriate “threshold” can sometimes be very 
challenging.64 These concerns and others explain the reluctance in 
the medical community to incentivize or even encourage the use of 
living donor organ transplantation.65 
2. Cadaveric Donor Organ Transplantation Ethical 
Considerations 
Due to the plethora of ethical concerns involved with living 
donor organ transplantation, health professionals instead have 
turned to cadaveric donor organ transplantation as the preferred 
method of organ procurement. However, CDT is not without its 
own ethical issues. The major ethical issues involved in organ 
transplants include concerns about: (1) preservation of the integrity 
and dignity of the human body,66 and (2) determination of when 
and how to honor the wishes of the deceased.67 For instance, policy 
makers must determine whether the next of kin may dictate if and 
how organs of the deceased should be allocated when a donor has 
died without expressing consent to donate his organs.68 Other 
ethical and administrative issues arise concerning fair allocation 
                                                 
63 Id. (citing the Nuffeld Working Party which asserted that xenotransplants 
should only commence when there was a ‘reasonable chance of success’). 
64 See id. (explaining that historically, people are unwilling to resist 
tangible benefit even in the face of unknown risk). 
65 See, e.g., AMA Guidelines infra note 191 (proposing use of financial 
incentives only for non-living donors). 
66 The President’s Council on Bioethics, Staff Background Paper, Organ 
Transplantation: Ethical Dilemmas and Policy Choices, http://www.bioethics. 
gov/background/org_transplant.html (last visited Sept. 14, 2005) [hereinafter 
The President’s Council on Bioethics]. This is an idea which one researcher 
labels as “a desacralization of the human body.” John H. Evans, Commodifying 
Life? A Pilot Study of Opinions Regarding Financial Incentives for Organ 
Donation, 28 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & LAW 1003, 1023 (2003) (“The notion that 
the body is somehow sacred and different from other objects is one of the 
deepest cultural notions in at least the Western culture tradition.”). 
67 The President’s Council on Bioethics, supra note 66, at Part IV. 
68 PRICE, supra note 14, at 15. 
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methods, such as determining which potential donees receive 
organs when they become available, and how that priority should 
be determined.69 
One primary area of ethical concern for both policymakers and 
lawmakers, even in the field of CDT, is the potential 
commodification of human organs.70 Concerns regarding the 
commodification of organs include the potential coercion and 
exploitation of those individuals most in need of money,71 and a 
general feeling that organ commodification in any form is 
inconsistent with the “most basic human values.”72 
The aforementioned issues concerning both living donor organ 
transplantation and cadaveric donor organ transplantation have the 
potential to impede any legislative reform undertaken to resolve 
the current organ deficiency. Theses ethical barriers must be 
considered when creating any new organ procurement method 
aimed at satisfying the growing need for organs. 
C. Legislative Background 
Aside from the ethical concerns, any new method for procuring 
organs must also overcome a legal obstacle. Physicians’ increasing 
ability to successfully transplant organs has precipitated much 
legislation.73 Both the federal and state governments have enacted 
                                                 
69 Id. at 18. This Note will focus primarily on CDT, although much has 
been written on LTD as a solution as well. 
70 See id. at 367-417. According to Dr. Abdallah S. Daar, a Professor at the 
University of Toronto, “Few questions in biomedical ethics are as challenging at 
present as the question of paid organ donation for transplantation, raising as it 
does difficult issues related to the body, the soul, property rights, autonomy, 
limitations of freedom, cultural/ethical pluralism and professional versus 
societal perceptions.” Id. at 367. 
71 GENERAL MEDICAL COUNCIL, GUIDANCE FOR DOCTORS ON 
TRANSPLANTATION OF ORGANS FROM LIVE DONORS, point 3 (1992), reprinted 
in GARWOOD-GOWERS, supra note 21, at 173. 
72 World Health Organization, Resolution WHA40.13, Development of 
Guiding Principles for Human Organ Transplants, reprinted in LEGISLATIVE 
RESPONSE TO ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION, supra note 7, at 467. 
73 Powhida, supra note 43, at 352-53. 
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legislation to deal with the relatively new phenomenon of organ 
transplants.74 Unfortunately, much of this legislation serves as an 
impasse to, rather than a route to, potential avenues of organ 
procurement. Congress and various state legislatures have enacted 
many laws with the express purpose of addressing the issues 
related to the rapidly growing field of organ transplant 
jurisprudence. Specifically, both federal and state legislators have 
placed various restrictions on organ trafficking and sale over the 
past two decades. 
1. Federal Legislation 
In 1984, Congress passed the National Organ Transplantation 
Act75 in an effort to address the needs of desperate families seeking 
organs and financial assistance for transplants, while combating 
the beginnings of a commercial market for organs.76 One integral 
aspect of NOTA is the creation of the Organ Procurement and 
Transplantation Network (OPTN).77 Among other tasks, the OPTN 
established a national list of individuals who need organs78 and a 
national system to match available organs with those in need.79 
In addition to the creation of a national list of potential organ 
donors and receivers, another important aspect of NOTA is a 
provision which prohibits organ purchases.80 This provision states, 
in pertinent part, “It shall be unlawful for any person to knowingly 
acquire, receive, or otherwise transfer any human organ for 
valuable consideration for use in human transplantation if the 
transfer affects interstate commerce.”81 Violation of this provision 
of NOTA carries with it a fine of up to $50,000, a prison sentence 
                                                 
74 See infra Part II.C.1-3. 
75 42 U.S.C. § 274 (2001). 
76 S. REP. NO. 98-382, at 2-3 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3975, 
3976-3977. 
77 42 U.S.C. § 274(a) (2001). 
78 42 U.S.C. § 274(b)(2)(A)(i) (2001). 
79 42 U.S.C. § 274(b)(2)(A)(ii) (2001). 
80 42 U.S.C. § 274e(a) (2001). 
81 Id. 
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of up to five years, or both.82 
2. State Legislation 
Laws concerning medical treatment, consent to procedures, and 
the definition of death fall under state jurisdiction.83 The 
prohibition of organ purchases in NOTA relates solely to interstate 
commerce.84 Therefore, the federal ban on purchasing human 
organs will not be violated unless the purchase occurs across state 
lines or otherwise impacts interstate commerce. However, a few 
years after the enactment of NOTA, the National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) created the 
Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (UAGA), recommending the 
prohibition of the sale or purchase of human organs for “valuable 
consideration” within individual states.85 Close to half of the fifty 
states have adopted portions of the UAGA.86 
Over the past decade, some states aspiring to increase the 
number of viable organs available within the state while still 
remaining within the guidelines of NOTA have taken modest steps 
to increase the number of people willing to donate their organs 
upon death.87 For example, some states have created trust funds to 
spur organ donation by increasing public awareness regarding the 
need for organ and tissue donation.88 Delaware created the Organ 
                                                 
82 42 U.S.C. § 274e(b) (2001). 
83 42 U.S.C. § 274e(a). 
84 S. REP. NO. 98-382, at 17 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3975, 
3983. 
85 See UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 10(a), 8A U.L.A. 62 (2003). 
86 See UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT, Table of Jurisdictions Wherein Act 
Has Been Adopted, 8A U.L.A. 3 (2003) (indicating jurisdictions where the 
UAGA has been adopted and date in which they were effective in those 
individual jurisdictions). But see MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-39-9 (1999) (declaring 
contracts for donation of organs to be lawful and requiring repayment of any 
“monetary consideration” received upon revocation). 
87 See Siegel, supra note 16, at 940-43. 
88 Steven P. Calandrillo, Cash for Kidneys? Utilizing Incentives to End 
America’s Organ Shortage, 13 GEO. MASON L. REV. 69, 131 (2004). 
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and Tissue Donation Awareness Trust Fund, 89 used to develop 
promotional campaigns and school programs encouraging donor 
registration through the state’s driver’s license program.90 Ohio 
created a similar trust fund, called the Second Chance Trust 
Fund,91 whose committee is charged with, among other things, the 
duty of approving “brochures, written materials, and electronic 
media regarding anatomical gifts and anatomical gift procedures 
for use in driver training schools.”92 Florida created the Florida 
Organ and Tissue Donor Education and Procurement Trust Fund, 
which distributes its funds for “educational purposes aimed at 
increasing the number of organ and tissue donors.”93 
3. New York State Legislation 
In 1985, New York adopted its own version of NOTA 
legislation, stating: “It shall be unlawful for any person to 
knowingly acquire, receive, or otherwise transfer for valuable 
consideration any human organ for use in human 
transplantation.”94 In February of 2004, New York’s legislature 
created by statute the “Life – Pass It On” Trust Fund (the Fund).95 
This law stipulates that money in the Fund “shall be expended only 
for organ transplant research and education projects approved by 
the commissioner of health, or to provide grants to not-for-profit 
corporations in this state which are incorporated for the purpose of 
increasing and promoting organ and tissue donation awareness.”96 
The recent initiatives in New York and other states such as 
Delaware, Ohio, and Florida do not represent drastic changes in 
existing law. Rather, they are merely modest attempts at easing the 
current organ shortage problem without crossing the prohibited 
                                                 
89 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 2729(a) (2003). 
90 Id. at § 2730(b)(1). 
91 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2108.15 (Anderson 2002). 
92 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2108.17(G)(4) (Anderson 2002). 
93 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.5216(1) (West 2005). 
94 N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4307 (McKinney 2002). 
95 N.Y. STATE FIN. LAW § 95-d (McKinney Supp. 2005). 
96 Id. at § 95-d(3). 
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line of organ selling or buying drawn by NOTA and the UAGA. 
With the organ shortage reaching crisis status,97 it is clear that 
more proactive and radical steps should be taken in order to 
adequately manage this predicament, keeping in mind the ethical 
and legal factors which serve as potential obstacles to any 
legislative reform. 
III. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS 
With the deficit between those waiting for organs and those 
donating them continuing to widen, government officials and 
academic scholars have found it necessary to consider other viable 
solutions to encourage organ donation. Two distinct methods for 
increasing the donor pool have been identified. The first method is 
to maximize the efficiency of the existing organ procurement 
system through distribution and allocation improvements.98 The 
second method is to increase the supply of organs by expanding 
into new donor populations by way of education or providing 
incentives.99 
A. Increasing the Efficiency of the Procurement System 
One innovative but controversial method aimed at maximizing 
the efficient use of available organs is to eliminate entire classes of 
people from recipient lists. Such arguments have been explored 
with regard to liver transplants for alcoholics100 and with regard to 
convicted criminals.101 Congress has also focused on the efficient 
allocation of currently available organs through the formation of a 
                                                 
97 See supra notes 2-5 and accompanying text. 
98 THE ETHICS OF ORGAN TRANSPLANTS, supra note 34, at 10. 
99 Id. 
100 Alvin H. Moss & Mark Siegler, Should Alcoholics Compete Equally for 
Liver Transplantation, in THE ETHICS OF ORGAN TRANSPLANTS, supra note 34, 
at 275. 
101 Lawrence J, Schneiderman & Nancy S. Jecker, Should a Criminal 
Receive a Heart Transplant? Medical Justice v. Societal Justice, in THE ETHICS 
OF ORGAN TRANSPLANTS, supra note 34, at 294. 
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network to assist local agencies in distributing organs and through 
the creation of a task force on organ donation to monitor the 
problems and issues related to organ donation and 
transplantation.102 
1. Eliminating Alcoholics 
The primary reason given for possibly barring alcoholics from 
competing equally with other patients on the liver transplant 
waiting list is that individuals should bear some responsibility for 
medical problems, such as cirrhosis,103 associated with voluntary 
choices, such as alcohol abuse.104 According to this proposal, due 
to dire scarcity of donor livers, it would only be fair that 
individuals who develop liver disease through no fault of their 
own—such as those who have a congenital liver disease—should 
have a higher priority in receiving a liver transplant than those 
whose liver disease results from failure to obtain treatment for 
alcoholism.105 
Those opposed to disqualification of alcoholics from 
procurement lists argue that it is based on nothing more than an 
unjust common conviction that alcoholics are morally 
blameworthy for their own condition and thus should be 
disqualified from the competition for rare donor livers.106 
Opponents of barring alcoholics from equal access to donor livers 
insist that qualification for a new organ should not require moral 
virtue or a cancellation of a moral vice on the part of the would-be 
recipient.107 Rather, moral evaluation should be entirely excluded 
from all deliberations concerning candidacy for liver 
                                                 
102 See infra. Part III.A.3. 
103 Progressive disease of the liver. STEDTMAN’S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 
256 (3d ed. 1972). 
104 Moss & Siegler, supra note 100, at 278. 
105 Id. at 279. 
106 Carol Cohen et al., Alcoholics and Liver Transplantation, in THE 
ETHICS OF ORGAN TRANSPLANTS, supra note 34, at 286. 
107 Id. at 287. 
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transplantation.108 
2. Eliminating Convicted Criminals 
Some scholars have argued to exclude convicted criminals 
from procurement lists.109 However, eliminating convicted 
criminals from recipient lists, based merely on past behavior, may 
not be justifiable from a medical justice perspective.110 There is a 
general acceptance within the medical profession that physicians 
owe patients consideration based solely on potential medical 
benefits, without any regard to non-medical factors.111 
Nonetheless, medical justice is often tainted by societal factors,112 
and in a just society, principles of distributive justice govern the 
distribution of burdens and benefits.113 Thus, scholars argue that, in 
a society where certain life-saving medical treatments are limited, 
those who have already taken benefits away from those who have 
attempted to live justly should not be eligible for further benefits, 
such as those limited treatments.114 
Methods for alleviating the critical organ shortage by 
eliminating certain undesirable organ transplant recipients are 
radical and will require sacrificing sacred notions of justice and 
valuable oppositions to discrimination in the medical profession.115 
In contrast to the previous two suggestions, Congress has created a 
                                                 
108 Id. 
109 Schneiderman & Jecker, supra note 101. 
110 Id. at 298. 
111 Id. 
112 Id. 
113 Id. at 299. 
114 Id. at 300. Schneiderman and Jecker therefore propose that convicted 
criminals should be entitled to only a “rudimentary decent minimum” level of 
care, which would not include equal access to such treatments as heart 
transplants. Id. at 303. 
115 Gina Kolata, Inmate Fears Death Because Prison Won’t Finance 
Transplant, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 1994, § 1, at 6. According to Arthur Caplan, “It 
is absolutely wrong to make judgments about past behavior, criminal conduct, 
moral worth, indictments, charges or conviction” for the purposes of allocating 
organs.” Id. 
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less controversial method to increase the efficiency of the current 
organ procurement system, which is highlighted in the next 
section. 
3. Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network and the Task 
Force 
Congress, with the passing of NOTA, created its own system 
for maintaining an efficient method of allocating organs.116 The 
OPTN was developed to help regional organ procurement agencies 
better distribute organs to a broader area and adopt more uniform 
and higher quality standards for the procurement and distribution 
of donated organs.117 These regional organ procurement 
organizations are charged with a duty to locate potential organ 
donors and arrange for the acquisition, preservation, and 
transportation of the organs to organ centers.118 In addition, 
Congress has created a Task Force on Organ Transplantation119 to 
examine the problems and issues relating to organ procurement 
and transplantation.120 
The success of Congressional methods of increasing the 
efficiency of organ procurement and allocation is questionable. 
The shortage of suitable organs continues to grow and the need for 
transplantable organs is at a record high. For the first time, the 
number of people waiting for a deceased donor kidney transplant 
in the United States has recently exceeded 60,000.121 It seems that 
                                                 
116 42 U.S.C. § 274 (2001). 
117 See James F. Blumstein, Government’s Role in Organ Transplantation 
Policy, 14 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 5, 13 (1989) (“The role of the OPTN was 
to establish a registry of patients in need of organs and potential recipient lists 
on the registry.”). 
118 42 U.S.C. § 273(a-b) (2001). 
119 National Organ Transplantation Act, Title 1-Task Force on Organ 
Transplantation, 42 U.S.C. § 273 (1994). 
120 Pub. L. No. 98-507, § 101(b)(1)(A), 98 Stat. 2339 (1984). 
121 Organ Procurement and Transplant Network, Kidney Transplant Need 
Exceeds 60,000,http://www.optn.org/news/newsDetail.asp?id=358 (reported on 
Oct. 14, 2004). 
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Congress’s focus on the efficient allocation of the current supply 
of organs has not been successful in reversing the organ shortage 
crisis. The evidence of the steady decline in the supply of 
available, transplantable organs has encouraged some 
governmental institutions to shift gears in their approach to the 
problem and attempt to increase the supply of organs made 
available by increasing the actual supply of organs rather than 
efficiently allocating the existing supply. 
B. Increasing the Supply of Organs 
There are many possible ways to increase the supply of 
organs.122 Among them are adopting a system of presumed 
consent, creating a market for organs, and expanding the criteria 
for transplantable organs. Many of these suggested methods of 
increasing the organ supply require the modification of existing 
law and policy, and reconsideration of entrenched moral and legal 
frameworks and are still untested and unproven. Nonetheless, some 
of these newer methods have gained support in academic circles 
and in other parts of the world. 
1. Presumed Consent 
One suggested proposal for increasing organ donation is the 
creation of “presumed consent” statutes.123 Under this method, 
unless a person affirmatively “opts out” during his lifetime, his 
organs will automatically be donated at death.124 Many European 
                                                 
122 Some of these methods will be explained below. 
123 For a full discussion promoting this solution, see Kelly Ann Keller, The 
Bed of Life: A Discussion of Organ Donation, its Legal and Scientific History, 
and a Recommended “Opt-Out” Solution to Organ Scarcity, 32 STETSON L. 
REV. 855 (2003). Cf. Powhida, supra note 43 (questioning the constitutional 
validity of presumed consent statutes). 
124 See Shelby E. Robinson, Comment, Organs for Sale? An Analysis of 
Proposed Systems for Compensating Organ Providers, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 
1019, 1031 (1999) (referring alternatively to presumed consent as “routine 
salvage”). 
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countries have adopted this method.125 Despite being suggested by 
the UAGA,126 only a minority of states in this country enacted 
presumed consent statutes when they adopted other parts of the 
UAGA.127 Even in those states which have adopted presumed 
consent statutes,128 the statute’s application is limited to bodies 
under the authority of the coroner or medical examiner,129 and is 
generally only applicable to the removal of corneas and pituitary 
glands.130 In most states, failure to “opt out” is not akin to 
consent.131 Rather “reasonable efforts” are required to obtain 
consent from the next of kin before organs can be harvested.132 
Some opponents of the presumed consent method question the 
very presumption upon which the laws are based, which is that 
individuals actually would consent to the donation of their organs 
if they had been presented the with the option while alive.133 Other 
opponents to the presumed consent method see it as failing on 
ethical grounds, believing the concept of “silence as consent” to be 
antithetical to American culture.134 
2. Creating a Market for Organs 
An alternative solution is opening a futures market for 
                                                 
125 Radhika Rao, Property, Privacy and the Human Body, 80 B. U. L. REV. 
359, 381 n.77 (2000). 
126 UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT, supra note 85, at 43. 
127 Rao, supra note 125, at 380. 
128 See id. at 380 n.76. 
129 Id. at 381 n.77. 
130 Id. at 380. 
131 Id. at 381. 
132 Id. In practice, however, the difference between laws requiring 
reasonable efforts and those presuming consent may only be one of semantics. 
Id. at 382. 
133 R. M. Veatch & J.B. Pitt, The Myth of Presumed Consent: Ethical 
Problems in New Organ Procurement Strategies, in THE ETHICS OF ORGAN 
TRANSPLANTS, supra note 34, at 176. 
134 Robinson, supra note 124, at 1032. 
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organs.135 A so-called “organ market” would allow individuals 
before death, or surviving family members after death, to sell their 
own or their loved ones’ organs in a private contract.136 Thus far 
this proposal has been met with widespread resistance because it 
entails the full-scale transformation of the body into property and 
might lead to unequal allocation of organs.137 The fear is that the 
wealthiest individuals will have the greatest access to organs by 
virtue of their wealth.138 Despite these drawbacks, this suggested 
solution has gained mild acceptance in academic circles.139 
3. Transplanting “Marginal” or “Extended Criteria” Organs 
American society has witnessed a “shift in the donor pool.”140 
Several conditions, including increased seat-belt use, have 
deprived transplantation of its most reliable sources of pristine 
organs.141 This scarcity in organs has led transplant specialists to 
relax the standards of who can donate.142 The result is a 
considerable increase in the transplanting of “marginal” or 
“extended criteria” organs in the last several years.143 Criteria such 
as age, health, and lifestyle of donors have all but evaporated.144 
                                                 
135 See Henry Hansmann, The Economics and Ethics of Markets for Human 
Organs, 14 J. HEALTH & HUM. POL. 57 (1989) (discussing the possibility of 
regulating a market for human organs). See also S. Gregory Boyd M.D., 
Considering a Market in Human Organs, 4 N.C. J. L. & TECH., 417, 468-472 
(2003) (proposing different organ market possibilities). 
136 President’s Council on Bioethics, supra note 66, at Part III.4. 
137 Id. 
138 Id. 
139 See Calandrillo, supra note 88, at 108-111 (calling future markets a 
“solid step in the right direction, and certainly a substantial improvement over 
current supply incentives”). 
140 Gretchen Reynolds, Will Any Organ Do?, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, July 
10, 2005, at 37. 
141 Id. at 38. 
142 Id. 
143 Id. 
144 Id. at 38-39 (referencing one case in which N.Y.U. transplanted a liver 
from a deceased 80-year-old and commenting on the recent phenomenon of 
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With the demand for transplant organs still growing, despite these 
lower standards, some academics have suggested using other even 
more controversial and untested approaches to fill the donor 
pool.145 
Any method adopted for increasing the supply or organs must 
seek to strike a balance between potential success and ethical and 
legal concerns. Therefore, a method which could potentially 
increase the supply of organs, but suffers from being ethically 
questionable and legally unsound, will be met with opposition 
from any number of ethicists, scholars or legislators. One solution 
which seems to strike the balance of these factors may be to offer 
moderate financial incentives to donors or their families in 
exchange for their organs upon death. 
IV. PROVIDING FINANCIAL INCENTIVES 
One solution at the forefront of legal and policy discussions146 
is to allow for a financial compensation to potential donors or their 
                                                 
transplanting livers infected with Hepatitis C into healthy patients). 
145 Those include: (1) harvesting the organs of executed prisoners, see 
LOUIS J. PALMER, JR., ORGAN TRANSPLANTS FROM EXECUTED PRISONERS: AN 
ARGUMENT FOR THE CREATION OF DEATH SENTENCE ORGAN REMOVAL 
STATUTES (1999). But see Whitney Hinkle, Giving Until it Hurts: Prisoners are 
not the Answer to the National Organ Shortage, 35 IND. L. REV. 593 (2002) 
(arguing against the proposal that organs be obtained from executed prisoners); 
(2) a communitarian approach in which people’s preferences are changed 
through moral persuasion, see Amitai Etzioni, Organ Donation: A 
Communitarian Approach, 13 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 1, 5 (2003); and (3) a 
system of mutuality where only those consenting to donate their own organs 
would receive priority for a needed transplant, see Richard Schwindt & Aidan 
Vining, Proposal for a Mutual Insurance Pool for Transplant Organs, 23 J. 
HEALTH, POL., POL’Y, & L., 725, 727 (1998). See also Rupert Jarvis, Join the 
Club: A Modest Proposal to Increase Availability of Donor Organs, in THE 
ETHICS OF ORGAN TRANSPLANTS, supra note 34, at 190-91 (extolling the virtues 
of this system for potentially reducing donor demand while at the same time 
increasing the supply). 
146 See Ovetta Wiggins, Pa. Organ Donors Get $300 Boost, PHILADELPHIA 
INQUIRER, May 27, 2002, available at http://www.philly.com/mld/ 
inquirer/3346239.htm?1c. 
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families in exchange for their consent to donate their organs or 
their deceased family member’s organs upon death.147 The theory 
is that compensation in some form would provide adequate 
incentives for organ donation which do not exist under the current 
altruistic-reliant system, and that increasing incentives to donate 
would thereby lead to an increased number of organ donations.148 
A. Types of Financial Incentives 
There are three types of incentives: non-financial or “moral” 
incentives, direct economic payment, and indirect financial 
incentives.149 Because it would most adequately address the above 
mentioned hurdles facing any organ donation reform, a program of 
indirect financial incentives would be the most effective. There are 
many hurdles, however, in enacting a program that involves the 
offering of financial incentives in exchange for organs, including: a 
practical hurdle in obtaining donor consent, an ethical hurdle in 
accepting the moral consequences of such a program, and a legal 
hurdle in fitting the program into existing legislation. 
The first type of incentive is non-financial, referred to as 
“moral” incentives.150 These moral incentives to donate organs 
might include commemorative certificates, plaques, or medals of 
honor to be given to donors or their families in order to express 
appreciation for their life-saving gifts.151 Although this moral 
incentive model may avoid many of the ethical pitfalls that are 
normally associated with real monetary incentives, it is potentially 
ineffective as it is an insufficient incentive to produce the number 
of organs needed.152 Another type of incentive is direct economic 
                                                 
147 See Sten, supra note 34, at 214-19 (advocating a “death penalty pilot 
program” whereby a $1,000 dollar payment is made to families of organ 
donors). 
148 Boyd, supra note 135, at 472. 
149 Robert V. Veatch, Why Liberals Should Accept Financial Incentives for 
Organ Procurement, 13 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 19, 21-24 (2003). 
150 Id. at 20-21. 
151 Id. at 21. 
152 Id. at 21. 
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payment.153 This approach may be the most effective in eliciting 
the largest number of organ donations, but it carries with it many 
of the traditional concerns that exist with organ commodification 
and organ markets, such as discrimination against the poor,154 the 
potential for coercion of those desperate for food and money,155 
and the concern about unethical offers.156 A third type of incentive 
takes the form of indirect financial incentives.157 This includes 
payments which serve as compensation for costs incurred in the 
donation process,158 such as the funeral expenses of the donor or 
the expenses incurred by family members in attending to the death 
of the donor.159 One advantage to this system is that it creates some 
distance between the decision to provide organs and the economic 
benefit of doing so.160 However, the effectiveness and integrity of 
this approach has encountered some criticism, as one scholar 
explained that it is “immorally deceptive since [organs] would be 
given under the pretense that there is no payment of cash to the 
decision maker when, in effect, there is.”161 Regardless, this 
solution is the most attractive because, unlike other proposed 
solutions, it would address all three hurdles normally associated 
with organ procurement reform. 
1. Practical Hurdle—Obtaining Donor Consent 
The indirect incentive plan has the potential of being an 
effective form of motivation to encourage people to consent to 
                                                 
153 Id. at 26. Dr. Veatch himself endorses this approach, see id. at 31-33 
(calling for a reassessment of old traditional liberal values in response to the 
organ shortage crisis). See also Peters, supra note 34 (endorsing a plan where 
donors are awarded a $1,000 gift for the donation of their organs). 
154 Veatch, supra note 149, at 26. 
155 Id. at 27. 
156 Id. at 28-31. 
157 Id. at 21-24. 
158 See id. at 23-24. 
159 Id. at 23. 
160 Id. 
161 Id. at 22-24. 
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donate their organs upon death. Not only do preliminary studies in 
this country indicate approval for such a plan, but financial 
incentives programs have already been successful internationally. 
In the United States, studies on the matter show a general 
approval for incentives for organ donation in general, and a 
preference towards indirect financial incentives. In 1992, it was 
reported that nearly half of Americans support some kind of 
financial incentive for donation.162 
In 2003, a pilot study was performed to determine the public’s 
attitude toward families ending the life support of their loved ones 
in order to harvest his or her organs when various incentive 
programs are in place.163 The 2003 study found that the amount of 
money received from organ donation is a consideration in a 
family’s decision to discontinue life support.164 Specifically, the 
study indicated a preference for indirect commodification of 
organs (such as paying for the expenses related to the donation 
procedure) over a system where direct cash payments are made.165 
                                                 
162 See Warren, supra note 30 (citing a 1992 study that found that nearly 
half of Americans support some kind of incentive for organ donation). 
163 See Evans, supra note 66, at 1003. 
164 Id. Admittedly, this study goes beyond the scope of this note in that it 
seeks to prove that commodification of organs of some sort would lead to people 
allowing the person with the organs die when they otherwise would not. Id. at 
1008. However, if under these conditions financial incentives prove to be 
sufficient motivation for organ donation, then a fortiori, when the patient is 
already dead. 
165 Evans, supra note 66, at 1020. According to the author, one possible 
explanation for this is that people tend to consider dollars that circulate within 
the same institutional sphere to have the same moral status. Therefore, using the 
money from an organ donation would be acceptable to pay for the medical cost 
of removing the organ but it would be unacceptable to use the money to buy a 
car. Id. at 1022. Other studies did not produce as favorable results. Professors 
Thomas J. Cossé and Terry M. Weisenberger of Robins School of Business in 
Richmond, Virginia published their results on this subject in 1999. Thomas J. 
Cossé & Terry M. Weisenberger, Encouraging Human Organ Donation: 
Altruism Versus Financial Incentives, 6 J. NONPROFIT PUB. SECTOR MKTG. 77 
(1999). In four separate surveys conducted over the course of four years in 
Richmond, Virginia, participants were asked to respond to two questions: 1) 
Should financial incentives be offered to encourage families to donate? and 2) 
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Internationally, financial incentives for living kidney providers 
have increased the supply of kidneys, and small payments for 
burial expenses to the families of cadaveric donors have increased 
the supply of organs in European countries.166 
More important than the results from studies and surveys is the 
actual success of this type of model in one state. Pennsylvania’s 
attempt to use indirect financial incentives as a means of 
encouraging more organ donations has been successful in 
convincing many of its citizens to consent to donate their organs 
upon death. 
In 1994, Pennsylvania established the Organ Donation 
Awareness Trust Fund.167 The program encouraged citizens to 
register to donate organs and also sought contributions to the trust 
fund.168 Initially, part of the money from the trust fund was to be 
allocated to the compensation of donors for “reasonable hospital 
and medical expenses, funeral expenses, and incidental expenses 
incurred by the donor or donor’s family in connection with making 
a vital organ donation,” totaling as much as $3,000 per organ 
donor.169 By limiting expenditures to $3,000 per donor and 
requiring payment be made directly to the funeral home or hospital 
as opposed to the donor’s family, next of kin, or estate, 
Pennsylvania legislators hoped that the compensation paid would 
                                                 
Describe your level of comfort, presenting donor option currently versus that of 
financial incentives. Id. at 87. They concluded from the results that there is only 
limited public support to use financial incentives to encourage organ donation. 
Id. at 91. However, even Professors Cosse and Weisenberger concede that the 
findings of the study should be limited to the southeastern metro area in which 
the participants resided. Id. 
166 Jackson, supra note 44. 
167 20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8621 (West Supp. 2005). The fund is now named 
The Governor Robert P. Casey Memorial Organ and Donation Awareness Trust 
Fund, named after the former Pennsylvania governor who was a multiple organ 
transplant recipient. The fund was created by State Representative Bill Robinson 
after he learned that the mother of a boy, whose heart and liver were donated to 
Casey, had no life insurance benefits and had to raise money to be able to bury 
her son. Wiggins, supra note 146. 
168 Jackson, supra note 44. 
169 Id. 
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not be deemed “valuable consideration” to “acquire, receive or 
otherwise transfer” the organ, thereby avoiding the prohibitions on 
the sale of organs in NOTA.170 Pennsylvania state health officials 
subsequently lowered the incentive to $300 per organ donor.171 
The revised plan finally went into effect in January 2002.172 
Despite speculation that the modified amount offered to donors 
or their families would do little to ameliorate their hardships and 
would be deemed as merely incidental,173 the plan seemed to have 
an immediate effect. Between January and May of 2002, 19 donors 
or donor families applied for the $300 benefit.174 Contributions 
collected from motor vehicle registration and driver’s license and 
identification card renewals combined to add over $600,000 to the 
fund from July 1, 2003 to June 30, 2004.175 Furthermore, 41.83% 
of Pennsylvanians (or 3,803,915 Pennsylvanians) carrying a 
driver’s license, permit, or identification card now display the 
“Organ Donor” designation.176 This represents a .5% increase over 
the year before, or an additional 83,344 citizens of the state of 
Pennsylvania, consenting to donate their organs upon death. Thus, 
at least in Pennsylvania, indirect financial incentives have proven 
to be a successful means of increasing organ donations. 
2. Ethical Hurdle 
The greatest objection to a compensation policy regarding 
                                                 
170 Id. 
171 Boyd, supra note 135, at 460. 
172 Id. at 459. 
173 See Jackson, supra note 44 (“The amounts being considered as financial 
incentives in Pennsylvania and under the AMA’s proposal seem trivial, and are 
unlikely to ameliorate the hardship that a family may experience following 
death.”). 
174 Wiggins, supra note 146. 
175 PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, ORGAN DONATION 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE, 2004 ANNUAL REPORT TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY 2, 
available at http://www.dsf.health.state.pa.us/health/lib/health/OrganDonation 
AnnualReport4pdf2004.pdf (last visited Sept. 28, 2005). 
176 Id. 
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organ donation is that it “opens the door” to ethical issues and 
problems, such as the dangers and fears of the possible 
ramifications of any commodification of the human body.177 
However, by reframing old values in the context of the current 
organ deficit crisis and setting up a system where strong guidelines 
are followed and indirect and modest incentives are offered, these 
vehement ethical concerns can be assuaged. 
a. Utilitarianism 
From an ethical standpoint, what is considered right and wrong 
is often dependent on the philosophical perspective through which 
something is perceived.178 In philosophical thought, there exist two 
well-known perspectives which are relevant to a discussion of 
whether or not the use of commodification-like methods is 
ethically appropriate: deontology and consequentialism.179 A 
deontological perspective determines rightness or wrongness based 
on an independent system of values and not purely by 
consequences.180 By contrast, utilitarianism, a key brand of 
consequentialistic thought,181 judges consequences in terms of their 
use value.182 Thus, from a utilitarian perspective the rightness or 
wrongness of an action is determined not by an objective set of 
values but by whether, on balance, it produces more pleasure than 
pain.183 
From a utilitarian standpoint, certain medical interventions 
which would normally be considered ethically objectionable can be 
justified if, in the greater sense, they have the prospect of being 
                                                 
177 The President’s Council on Bioethics, supra note 66, Part III.3. 
178 See GARWOOD-GOWERS, supra note 21, at 1 (“As well as forming an 
ethical guide to medical professionals, philosophical approaches and principles 
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beneficial as opposed to harmful.184 Following this approach in 
organ donation policy, financial incentive methods used to increase 
the supply of organs would then be considered by utilitarians to be 
ethically meritorious simply because more persons who would 
otherwise die would be kept alive.185 Thus, using 
commodification-like techniques to procure more organs would be 
morally just to a consequentialist, merely because the 
consequences of such techniques would save more lives in the long 
run. 
b. Re-examining Old Values 
The possibility of commodification-like methods brings other 
ethical concerns such as the integrity and dignity of the human 
body and general feelings that commodification methods are 
inconsistent with human values.186 These concerns, although 
admirable, are quite limiting in times of crisis. Therefore, it is 
necessary to re-examine those values in the context of the current 
organ shortage crisis. 
From a legal theory perspective, changing times often call for a 
change in law. In many instances, proactive legislation is needed to 
recognize change and adjust the law accordingly. When those 
situations arise, legislators have a responsibility to act for their 
citizens and change the law to meet the changes in society. As 
Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. once said: 
When we find that in large and important branches of the 
law the various grounds of policy on which the various 
rules have been justified are later inventions to account for 
what are in fact survivals from more primitive times, we 
have a right to reconsider the popular reasons, and, taking a 
broader view of the field, to decide anew whether those 
reasons are satisfactory.187 
                                                 
184 Id. at 2-3. 
185 See Evans, supra note 66, at 1022. 
186 See supra Part II.B.2. 
187 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES JR., THE COMMON LAW 26 (Barnes and 
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Thus, times of crisis and necessity cry out for a need to 
reassess historical notions of right and wrong. Ideas and 
suggestions which may have previously offended our sacred 
notions of morality and ethics and have been the basis for old laws 
might then need to be reexamined in light of new potential benefits 
that are being offered to society. Following this concept, legislators 
must reassess their past apprehension towards financial incentives 
in light of the current shortage of transplantable organs.188 
c. The AMA Guidelines 
In the medical community a financial incentive program for 
organ donation has begun to gain more support. The American 
Medical Association (AMA) has adopted guidelines for a pilot 
program for financial incentives for organ donors.189 The new 
policy, entitled “Ethical Aspects of Future Contracts for Cadaveric 
Donors,” was recently introduced in July of 2004. The policy 
asserts that financial incentives may be offered to potential organ 
donors provided that certain guidelines are followed.190 Some of 
                                                 
Noble Books 2004) (1881). 
188 See also Boyd, supra note 135, at 471 (concluding that there can and 
should be an effective market option that is ethically palatable, which the author 
calls a “practical market”). 
189 American Medical Association, H-370.979, Financial Incentives for 
Organ Procurement, available at http://www.ama-assn.org/apps/pf_new/pf_ 
online?f_n=browse&doc=policyfiles/HnE/H-370.979.HTM (last visited Oct. 19, 
2004).  
190 The following is the text from the AMA guidelines: 
The AMA has adopted the following guidelines for a pilot program of 
financial incentives for future contracts regarding organ donations: (1) 
there is enough evidence in favor of employing some form of financial 
incentive to justify the implementation of a pilot program. This 
program, as with any policy involving financial incentives to encourage 
organ donation, should have adequate regulatory safeguards to ensure 
that the health of donors and recipients is in no way jeopardized, and 
that the quality of the organ supply is not degraded. This pilot program 
should operate for a limited time, in a limited geographical region, and 
have the following safeguards. (2) Incentives should be limited to 
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the key aspects of these guidelines include prohibiting the use of 
organs from a living person and limiting the financial incentives to 
that of “moderate value.” 
These guidelines, if used as a framework for a new 
compensation scheme, would advance efforts to alleviate many of 
the ethical concerns commonly associated with organ 
commodification schemes. An absence of the ethical concerns 
should then create a general public attitude which favors the idea 
of organs donated for financial compensation. 
d. Indirect and Modest Incentives 
Finally, a program which offers modest and indirect incentives 
                                                 
future contracts offered to prospective donors. By entering into a future 
contract, an adult would agree while still competent to donate his or her 
organs after death. In return, the appropriate state agency would agree 
to give some financial remuneration to the donor’s family or estate after 
the organs have been retrieved and judged medically suitable for 
transplantation. Under a system of future contracts, several other 
conditions would apply: (a) No incentives should be allowed for organs 
procured from living donors. (b) It would be inappropriate to offer 
financial incentives for organ donation to anyone other than the person 
who would actually serve as the source of the organs. Only the 
potential donor, and not the potential donor’s family or other third 
party, may be given the option of accepting financial incentives for the 
donation of his or her own organs. In addition, the potential donor must 
be a competent adult when the decision to donate is made, and the 
donor must not have committed suicide. (c) Any incentive should be of 
moderate value and should be the lowest amount that can reasonably be 
expected to encourage organ donation. By designating a state agency to 
administer the incentive, full control over the level of incentive can be 
maintained. (d) Payment of any incentive should occur only after the 
harvested organs have been judged medically suitable for 
transplantation. Suitability should continue to be determined in 
accordance with the procedures of the Organ Procurement and 
Transplantation Network. (e) Incentives should play no part in the 
allocation of donated organs among potential transplant recipients. The 
distribution of organs for transplantation should continue to be 
governed only by ethically appropriate criteria relating to medical need. 
Id. 
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to donors or their families would seem to sidestep many of the 
ethical issues that other commodification methods may face. For 
example, one common ethical concern is that commodification 
could potentially be a source of inappropriate coercion to those in 
need of money.191 However, by following a model similar to the 
one in Pennsylvania, this concern can be alleviated. Modest 
incentives which are paid to a funeral home, hospital, or service 
provider would be enough incentive to encourage without 
coercion. Some might argue that this type of program is 
“immorally deceptive”192 since money is actually being transferred 
to the donor. However, the indirect nature and modest value of the 
financial incentives, based on Pennsylvania’s successful model and 
proposed for New York, would certainly mitigate the moral 
turpitude of this type of incentive program to some degree. 
3. Legal Hurdle 
Even in enacting NOTA Congress asserted that it was not 
categorically opposed to all forms of financial compensation for 
donation.193 The legislative history indicates a desire to grant fair 
access to transplants to those who are in danger of losing their lives 
without the transplanted organ.194 NOTA’s Congressional 
legislative history highlights a desire on behalf of Congress to 
encourage the consideration of “alternative reimbursement 
policies” such as payment for transplantation procedures.195 
Furthermore, the Senate Report on NOTA stipulates that in 
enacting NOTA, it was not the intent of the committee that 
reasonable costs incurred in the process of organ donation be 
considered part of “valuable consideration.”196 Indeed, NOTA 
itself emphasizes that the term “valuable consideration” does not 
                                                 
191 See supra Part II. 
192 See supra note 161 and accompanying text. 
193 See S. REP. NO. 98-382, at 15-16 (1984), reprinted in 1984 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3975, 3981. 
194 Id. 
195 Id. 
196 Id. at 3982. 
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include various payments associated with the transplant procedure 
or “the expenses of travel, housing, and lost wages incurred by the 
donor of a human organ in connection with the donation of the 
organ.”197 Thus, although Congress intended to prevent the 
commercialization of the human body, such evidence illustrates 
that Congress intended to permit some organ procurement 
procedures which employ financial incentives.198 The creation of 
an alternative reimbursement policy which involves compensation 
which is less than “valuable” would not then endanger what 
Congress was intending to protect under NOTA—fair access to 
organs to all those in need. 
In fact, Congress and some states have already begun to 
endorse financial incentive programs as a viable way to solve the 
organ shortage problem. In April 2004, Title 42 of the United 
States Code was amended to provide for the “reimbursement of 
travel and subsistence expenses incurred by individuals toward 
making living donations of their organs.”199 In addition, federal 
legislation is pending which would “provide payments for the 
purchase of life insurance policies or annuities, payable to a 
donor’s designee”200—thereby providing modest compensation to 
the families or loved ones of those who volunteer their organs 
upon their own death. 
Among the various states, financial incentive-type legislation 
has also been enacted.201 Aside from Pennsylvania’s recently 
enacted program to promote increased organ donation,202 the state 
of Georgia enacted legislation to grant a discount on driver’s 
license issuance or renewal fees for those who indicate a 
                                                 
197 42 U.S.C. § 274e(c)(2) (2001). 
198 Sten, supra note 34, at 216. 
199 42 U.S.C.A. § 274f(a)(1) (Supp. 2005). 
200 H.R. 2856, 108th Cong. (2003). See also Alexander S. Curtis, Congress 
Considers Incentives for Organ Procurement, 13 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 51 
(2003) (discussing a series of bills, relating to types of incentives to offer would 
be donors, introduced during the 107th Congress). 
201 See Calandrillo, supra note 88, at 44-46 (discussing the fairly recent 
legislation in Wisconsin and Georgia). 
202 See supra Part IV. 
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willingness to execute an anatomical gift on their application.203 
More recently, the Wisconsin State Senate passed a bill calling for 
a state income tax deduction of up to $10,000 to cover expenses 
for residents who donate their organs.204 Although critics of the 
legislation question whether the legislation would violate NOTA, 
Wisconsin’s Governor expressed support of the bill.205 The law 
became effective in January 2004.206 Other states have passed 
similar legislation and many have already signed their bills into 
law.207 
 
V. NEW YORK’S POLICY ON ORGAN DONATION 
 
In 1985, out of concern for the undesirable consequences organ 
commodification could bring to the state, New York added Section 
4307 to the Public Health Laws, in effect banning any form of sale 
or purchase of human organs.208 The law declares, “It shall be 
unlawful for any person to knowingly acquire, receive, or 
otherwise transfer for valuable consideration any human organ for 
use in human transplantation.”209 However, it is clear that an 
indirect financial incentive program, similar to the one already in 
place in Pennsylvania, would violate neither the language nor the 
                                                 
203 GA. CODE ANN. §40-5-25[d] (2004). 
204 See Jo Napolitano, Wisconsin Senate Approves Tax Deduction for 
Organ Donors, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2004, at A12 (reporting on the passing of 
the bill in the State Senate after the after it had been “overwhelmingly 
approved” by the State Assembly in November of 2003). 
205 Id. (quoting Governor Doyle as saying, “I’m very supportive of it.”). 
206 Erin Madigan, States Offer Tax Breaks to Spur Organ Donation, 
Stateline.org, http://www.stateline.org/live/ViewPage.action?siteNodeId=136 
&languageId=1&contentId=15749 (Aug. 26, 2004). 
207 See Transplant Living, Financial Aspects: State Tax Deductions and 
Donor Laws, http://www.transplantliving.org/livingdonation/financialaspects/ 
statetax.aspx (last visited Oct. 2, 2005) (listing eight other states which have 
passed similar legislation). 
208 See supra Part II.C.3. 
209 N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4307 (McKinney 2002). 
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legislative intent of this law, and would even be consistent with 
New York’s policy on public health and welfare in general. 
A. The Language of Section 4307 
 
The 1985 New York legislation mirrors the language in NOTA 
by prohibiting organ transactions for “valuable consideration.”210 
Congress indicated the words “valuable consideration” allows for 
“alternative reimbursement policies,”211 and the legislative history 
of NOTA even stipulates that “reasonable costs” incurred in the 
process of organ donation should not be considered part of 
“valuable consideration.”212 NOTA itself states that the term 
“valuable consideration” does not include various payments 
associated with the transplant procedure or “the expenses of travel, 
housing, and lost wages incurred by the donor of a human organ in 
connection with the donation of the organ.”213 No doubt, it was this 
loose language that allowed Congress to enact §274f to allow for 
the “reimbursement of travel and subsistence expenses incurred by 
individuals toward making living donations of their organs.”214 
Thus, the conspicuous use of the same language, “valuable 
consideration” in the New York statute, likely prohibits only 
compensation which is deemed valuable. Minimum 
reimbursements for various transplant expenditures and other 
expenses related to the procedure do not fall under the language of 
the prohibition and would therefore likely be permissible under 
Section 4307 as they are under NOTA. 
                                                 
210 Id. 
211 S. REP. NO. 98-382, at 15-16 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
3975, 3981. 
212 Id. at 3982. 
213 42 U.S.C. § 274e(c)(2) (2001). 
214 42 U.S.C. § 274f(a)(1) (Supp. 2005). 
FLAMHOLZ MACROED.DOC 4/18/2006 1:07 PM 
 FINANCIAL INCENTIVES FOR ORGAN DONORS 367 
 
B. Legislative Intent of Section 4307 
The legislative history of Section 4307 indicates that some 
system of moderate indirect financial incentives would not violate 
the intentions of the New York state legislators who created the 
law.215 However, the types and amounts of financial incentives 
these legislators would allow are unclear. The view expressed by 
one New York legislator was that the sale of human organs should 
be prohibited for fear only of “widespread medical prostitution.”216 
Minor incentive programs to induce citizens to consider 
volunteering their organs are not likely to be considered “medical 
prostitution”217 since the minimal value of the consideration would 
hardly induce people to sell their organs simply for the value they 
would provide in return. Furthermore, in 1989, the New York State 
Task Force on Life and Law stated that it was following the federal 
government’s model in recommending against any type of 
incentive program in New York State.218 If that is the case, now 
that the federal government has acted to initiate a program to 
provide incentives to donors by offering reimbursement to donors 
for such things as travel and subsistence expenses incurred while 
making living donations of their organs,219 New York should 
follow its lead and enact a similar program. 
C. New York’s Policy on Public Health 
The New York State Constitution contains a provision which 
charges the state government with the affirmative responsibility to 
act in areas of policy regarded to be of special importance, such as 
public health.220 This provision states: 
                                                 
215 See Memorandum of Assemblyman Gorski, supra note 13. 
216 Id. 
217 Id. 
218 TRANSPLANTATION IN NEW YORK STATE: THE PROCUREMENT AND 
DISTRIBUTION OF ORGANS AND TISSUES, THE NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE ON 
LIFE AND LAW 53 (2d ed. 1989). 
219 42 U.S.C. § 274f(a)(1) (Supp. 2005). 
220 See THE NEW YORK STATE CONSTITUTION: A BRIEFING BOOK 232 
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The protection and promotion of the health of the 
inhabitants of the state are matters of public concern and 
provision therefor shall be made by the state and by such of 
its subdivisions and in such manner, and by such means as 
the legislature shall from time to time determine.221 
Added in 1938 to the State Constitution, this section was meant 
to place responsibility squarely on the state to protect and promote 
public health.222 The actual constitutionalization of such a 
provision is unique and indicates the State of New York’s strong 
desire to ensure that its citizens’ needs in the area of health care 
will be met.223 
The organ shortage crisis at hand is an area of policy that must 
be considered “of special importance.” The inevitable and 
unfortunate death of over 8,000 New York citizens is a public 
health crisis that should fall under the characterization of this 
provision of New York’s constitution. It is therefore incumbent 
upon the New York State legislature to heed to this provision and 
to use the means necessary to address the organ shortage crisis 
affecting New York citizens. Enacting a program of financial 
incentives would be a desirable and effective way to fulfill the 
legislature’s responsibility to protect the public health of New 
Yorkers.224 
Thus far New York has been slow to adopt its own incentive 
program for organ donations. Although some insurance incentive 
does exist for organ donors not covered by Medicaid225 and 
                                                 
(Gerald Benjamin ed. 1994). 
221 N.Y. CONST. art. XVII, § 3. 
222 Benjamin, supra note 220, at 235. 
223 Id. at 232. 
224 The Supreme Court has stated that it is the right and even duty of the 
state to take steps to protect the safety and health of the public. See, e.g., Nebbia 
v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 510, 523 (1934) (citing Justice Barbour’s statement 
that “it is not only the right, but the bounden and solemn duty of a state, to 
advance the safety, happiness and prosperity of its people, and to provide for its 
general welfare, by any and every act of legislation, which it may deem to be 
conducive to these ends” ). 
225 See MED-MANUAL, MEDICAID-NY §2.2.8.5 (reimbursing non-Medicaid 
FLAMHOLZ MACROED.DOC 4/18/2006 1:07 PM 
 FINANCIAL INCENTIVES FOR ORGAN DONORS 369 
 
legislation was recently passed to reward donors and their families 
with a medal of honor,226 these represent only modest steps to 
encourage organ donation. New York has not created any 
legislation which resembles the more innovative changes made on 
the federal level and in the state of Pennsylvania to proactively 
deal with this frightening organ shortage crisis. Given the severity 
of the crisis, the models established by Congress and some state 
governments, and the language and intent of the current ban on 
organ transaction in the state, it is time for New York to become 
more proactive in stemming the crisis and develop a financial 
incentive program of its own. 
VI. A SUGGESTED SOLUTION TO NEW YORK’S ORGAN SHORTAGE 
CRISIS 
Since the organ shortage is primarily due to low consent rates 
and not to a shortage of people dying with suitable organs,227 the 
efficacy of any program to adequately deal with the shortage 
would revolve primarily around the simple task of getting more 
people to consent to donate their organs upon their deaths. Studies 
indicate that Americans generally have a positive attitude toward 
organ donation and financial incentives.228 Thus, a program which 
would increase both the opportunities and the motivation for 
individuals to donate their organs would represent the best hope of 
increasing organ donation in New York. Therefore, this Note 
proposes that New York adopt a set of guidelines, similar to those 
of the AMA,229 combined with a model similar to the one created 
in Pennsylvania, in initiating a new financial incentive program to 
                                                 
covered donors donating to a Medicaid eligible recipient). 
226 See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4368 (Supp. 2004) (establishing a medal 
of honor “to be awarded annually to honor the memory of all individual organ 
donors or the gifts of donor families”). 
227 Reed, supra note 3. See also supra Part II.A. (citing statistics from the 
New York Organ Donor Network that New Yorkers fall below the national 
consent rate). 
228 Supra note 162 and accompanying text. 
229 See supra Part IV.A.2.c. 
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encourage organ donation. This type of program would provide 
New Yorkers with both an increased opportunity and a financial 
motivation to consent to donate while still keeping within the limit 
of what is deemed to be ethically responsible and morally 
tolerable. 
A. Guidelines of the Program 
The guidelines for the proposed program in New York to 
increase the number of available organs for transplants should be 
adopted from the AMA’s recent proposal regarding future 
contracts for cadaveric organ donors.230 These guidelines are 
inventive yet conservative, allowing for adequate initiative while 
still being moderate enough to avoid offending the public’s ethical 
and moral sensibilities. 
The AMA’s proposed pilot program suggests several 
regulatory safeguards,231 the purpose of which are to ensure both 
that “the health of donors and recipients is in no way jeopardized” 
and that the “quality of the organ supply is not degraded.”232 The 
AMA further suggests that incentives be offered by way of a 
“futures contract,” whereby a competent adult prospective donor 
can agree to donate his or her organs after death in exchange for a 
state agency’s agreement to give some financial remuneration to 
the donor’s family or estate after the organs have been retrieved 
and judged medically suitable for transplantation.233 The AMA 
includes other conditions under the “contract,” such as limiting the 
program to cadaveric donor organ transplantation as opposed to 
living donor organ transplantation,234 limiting the option to the 
prospective donor, not to his or her family or a third party,235 and 
restricting the application of this program to organ procurement, 
                                                 
230 American Medical Association, supra note 189. 
231 Id. 
232 Id. 
233 Id. It should be noted that the AMA does not specify any preference of 
type of remuneration—direct or indirect. 
234 Id. 
235 American Medical Association, supra note 189. 
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not to allocation or distribution.236 Perhaps most importantly, the 
proposal stipulates that “[A]ny incentive should be of moderate 
value and should be the lowest amount that can reasonably be 
expected to encourage organ donation.”237 Following this 
provision of the AMA guidelines would render the $10,000 tax 
deduction, adopted in Wisconsin238 to be too excessive. However, 
the $300 offered to Pennsylvanians who consent to donate their 
organs would be appropriate. The AMA further suggests that a 
state agency be designated to administer the incentive and exert 
full control over it to maintain the level of incentive.239 
B. Details of the Program 
With regard to the details of this program, this Note suggests 
that New York follow the example set by Pennsylvania’s program. 
Through slight modifications of existing state motor vehicle and 
tax forms, the State will find itself with both the monetary 
resources it needs to offer compensation to potential donors and 
the number of organs it needs to adequately address the existing 
shortage it faces. 
1. Existing and Pending Relevant Legislation 
Much of the legislation needed for this program is already in 
place or pending. New York driver license applications240 already 
contain a section where the applicant may check off a box to 
authorize the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) to send the 
applicant’s information to the Department of Health for inclusion 
in the Organ/Tissue Donor Registry.241 In addition, in February of 
                                                 
236 Id. 
237 Id. (emphasis added). 
238 See supra notes 204-206 and accompanying text. 
239 American Medical Association, supra note 189. 
240 New York State Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, Application for Drivers 
License or Non-Driver ID Card 1, available at http://www.nydmv.state.ny.us/ 
forms/mv44.pdf (last visited Oct. 2, 2005). 
241 Id. 
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2004, New York created its own trust fund for organ donation.242 
Another recently enacted law directs the DMV commissioner to 
develop license application and renewal forms that solicit a 
voluntary one dollar donation from persons applying for or 
renewing a driver’s license at the time of such application or 
renewal, with the money collected deposited in the “Life – Pass It 
On” Trust Fund, an organ donation trust fund.243 Finally, New 
York State Resident Tax Forms contain a section for “voluntary 
gift/contributions” where the filer may contribute to such causes as 
the Breast Cancer Research Fund, Return a Gift to Wildlife, the 
Alzheimer’s Fund, and others.244 Although the organ donation trust 
fund is not currently one of the options, a bill exists to include an 
additional box where a taxpayer may “check off” to make 
monetary contributions to the organ donation trust fund.245 
a. Modifying Existing Forms 
Under the proposed program, four forms will be modified to 
contain the option for the applicant to be included in the 
Organ/Tissue Donor Registry, like the one contained on the driver 
license application, and to make minimal contributions to the organ 
donation trust fund. The four forms are: 1) The driver license 
applications; 2) New York’s Vehicle Registration Application 
Form;246 3) New York’s on-line vehicle registration renewal 
                                                 
242 See supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text. 
243 N.Y. VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW § 508-5 (Supp. 2004). 
244 New York State Resident Income Tax Return (Form IT-201) 2, section 
56. 
245 See New York State Assembly Bill Summary A06692, available at 
http://assembly.state.ny.us/leg/?bn=A06692 (last visited Oct. 2, 2005). The bill, 
titled “An act to amend the tax law, in relation to providing a tax check off box 
on personal income tax return forms for the life pass it on trust fund” was last 
delivered to the Senate on June 6, 2005. Id. 
246 See NEW YORK STATE DEP’T OF MOTOR VEHICLES, VEHICLE 
REGISTRATION/TITLE APPLICATION, available at http://www.nydmv.state. 
ny.us/forms/mv82.pdf (last visited Oct. 2, 2005). 
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application;247 and 4) The New York State Resident Tax Forms. 
By including these options on all four of these forms, New York 
will guarantee that the options for organ donation will be presented 
to a large percentage of its citizens on a regular basis. For example, 
as of the end of 2004, there were 10,449,816 registered vehicles in 
New York State.248 The estimated total population of New York 
State at the end of 2004 was 19,227,088.249 This means that from 
the vehicle renewal applications alone, approximately 54% of the 
population of the state of New York will be presented with the 
option to donate organs and make contributions to the fund every 
time they renew their vehicle registration.250 
b. Required Response Format 
Finally, the request to donate, which will appear on the official 
state forms, must be presented as a “yes” or “no” question.251 
Applicants will be presented with the question, “Do you consent to 
make an anatomical gift to be effective upon your death?” Thus 
formatted, applicants will be forced to consider the question and 
answer it. The question cannot be overlooked or ignored when 
completing the form.252 This option would further serve as the 
“futures contract” suggested by the AMA. Furthermore, adding 
                                                 
247 The registrations for certain vehicles can currently be renewed on-line at 
NEW YORK STATE DMV, INTERNAL OFFICE TRANSACTIONS, http:// 
www.nydmv.state.ny.us/renew/default.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2005). 
248 NEW YORK STATE DEP’T OF MOTOR VEHICLES, STATISTICS, VEHICLE 
REGISTRATIONS IN FORCE 2004, available at http://www.nydmv.state.ny.us/ 
Statistics/regin03.htm (last visited Oct. 2, 2005). 
249 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, NEW YORK QUICK FACTS, available at 
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/ states/36000.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2005). 
250 This rough estimate does not take into account the numbers of people 
who have registered multiple vehicles. 
251 This strategy was suggested by Dr. Veatch in an earlier article he wrote. 
See Robert M. Veatch, Routine Inquiry About Organ Donation – an Alternative 
to Presumed Consent, 325 NEW ENG. J. MED. 17, 1246-49 (1991), cited in 
Veatch, supra note 149, at 32. 
252 These types of questions already appear on many computer based 
interactive forms where certain fields must be filled in to complete the form. 
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these sections to these forms would raise funds to finance the 
incentive program and will solicit donations of organs on a regular 
basis. 
2. Incentives Offered 
In addition, while some percentage of the proceeds from the 
fund will go towards increasing education and awareness of organ 
donation, another percentage of the proceeds from the fund in the 
proposed program will be directed towards a donor incentive 
program to pay for the expenses of prospective donors. Just as in 
Pennsylvania,253 the financial incentives to New Yorkers in 
exchange for consent to donate organs upon death would be 
indirect, such as payments for reasonable hospital bills, travel and 
funeral expenses, and other incidental expenses incurred by and 
related to the donation itself. These incentives would be the 
“financial remuneration” suggested by the AMA. The 
remuneration would be adequate motivation to encourage 
donation254 while avoiding the many moral pitfalls associated with 
direct financial incentives, such as association with 
commodification of organs. 
The amount of incentive would also be modest, so as not to 
offend any moral sensitivities people might have toward the 
exchange of money for human organs. As the AMA suggests, only 
incentives of “moderate value” should be offered.255 In addition, 
the legislative history of Section 4307 of New York’s Public 
Health Law implies that expenses such as travel or 
accommodations are not to be included in the definition of 
“valuable consideration.”256 To determine what the value should 
be, New York257 can follow the Pennsylvania model ($300), or 
                                                 
253 See supra notes 169-174 and accompanying text. 
254 See Evans, supra note 66, at 1025. 
255 Supra Part IV.A.2.c. 
256 Supra Part V.B. (citing the fear of the New York Legislature of creating 
“widespread medical prostitution”). 
257 The state agency that should be in charge of this program is the 
Department of Health, a department experienced in dealing with medical, health, 
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calculate its own figure which it deems to be the “lowest amount 
that can reasonably be expected to encourage organ donation.”258 
Thus, the legislative framework for this proposal is already in 
place. Slightly amending existing and pending legislation, and 
modifying existing state forms, should not be a difficult 
undertaking. These changes, while small in substance, will be a 
significant step for New York and its citizens to resolve the current 
transplantable organ deficiency. The proposed program will be the 
first steps to finally alleviating a crisis that looms large for many 
citizens of the state and for their families. The new program’s 
import should not be underestimated and its necessity should not 
be overlooked. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Each day that goes by, more people are added to an organ 
waiting list and more people die waiting on that list. Individuals 
suffering from organ failure and their families must cope with their 
sickness, knowing that the technology and resources now exist to 
save them. The one obstacle is connecting the resources to the 
demand. An effective solution is already in place in Pennsylvania. 
It is incumbent upon the legislators of New York to create its own 
solution that would most effectively work towards solving this 
grave problem. The means exist; it is now up to the legislators to 
provide a method that could possibly save thousands of lives in 
their state and put an end to this horrific crisis. 
                                                 
and safety matters, which would qualify it as the most adept at deciding crucial 
issues involved in allocating financial incentives for organ donations. 
258 See American Medical Association Guidelines, supra note 189, at 
(2)(c). 
